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I. INTRODUCTION 
Super PACs seem to have burst upon the electoral scene in 2010, 
following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens 
United v. Federal Elections Commission.1  Like that decision, Super PACs 
have generally drawn a bad press for similar reasons and from the 
usual suspects.  Critics claim they will buy our elections, steal our 
democracy, and drown out the voices of the average voter.2  They will 
allow the tiniest top sliver of “the 1%” to dominate our elections and 
pollute our politics.3  We must find a way to stop them! 
Well, of course, any attempt to “stop them” immediately bumps 
into the First Amendment to the Constitution, which provides, in 
relevant part, that: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress 
of grievances.”4  These efforts may also be contrary to the reasons why 
the Framers wrote, and we cherish, those protections in the first 
place: to have the most robust, uninhibited, and wide-open discussion 
and debate about the politicians and the policies that have an 
 
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  I want to thank Anna Kordas, 
Brooklyn Law School, class of 2014, for her research assistance on this article.  Some 
of the themes suggested in this article are also briefly set forth in Joel M. Gora, Free 
Speech, Fair Elections, and Campaign Finance Laws: Can They Co-Exist?  56 HOW. L. J. 763, 
774–80 (2013).  I should also note that as a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU), I helped challenge the campaign finance restrictions at issue in 
many of the cases discussed in this article, most notably, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976) and Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 1  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2  See, e.g., Adam Lioz, Where The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Money in Politics 
Meet, DEMOS, Sept. 13, 2012, http://www.demos.org/blog/where-voting-rights-act-
1965-and-money-politics-meet; Editorial, When Other Voices Are Drowned Out, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/opinion/when-other-
voices-are-drowned-out.html?_r=0. 
 3  Liz Kennedy, Stop The Next Citizens United, DEMOS, Sept. 10, 2013, 
http://www.demos.org/publication/stop-next-citizens-united.  
 4   U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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increasingly large impact on our everyday lives.  The Framers’ goal 
was to disable the government from controlling the political speech 
and association indispensable to choosing and controlling the 
government.5  Viewed in that light, Super PACs, far from being the 
enemy of democracy, become its ally.  This article is a defense of 
Super PACs and of the First Amendment principles and imperatives 
they embody and reflect. 
II. THE ORIGINAL “SUPER PAC” 
Sheldon Adelson—famous wealthy backer of Newt Gingrich and 
Mitt Romney and staunch supporter of Israel and other causes—was 
not the first big donor to a “Super PAC” in modern times.  Arguably, 
that honor belongs to a man named Randolph Phillips.  His group 
was not very “super” in financial terms, and it was not ultimately 
found by a federal appellate court to be a political action committee 
(PAC).6  Phillips was a relatively wealthy person and a liberal critic of 
the war in Vietnam.  In the spring of 1972, he and a few like-minded 
friends, who were very upset about the way President Nixon was 
conducting the war, decided to do something about it.  They passed 
the hat among themselves, raised a considerable amount of money—
slightly over $100,000 by today’s standards—and sponsored a two-
page ad in the New York Times.7  The ad was the print version of a 
“negative” attack ad.  It called Nixon a “war criminal,” accused him of 
committing specific war crimes—such as ordering the bombing of 
innocent civilian non-combatants—and urged that he be impeached.8  
The advertisement also praised a lonely handful of members of 
Congress who had introduced an impeachment resolution.9  The ad 
hoc group was called the National Committee for Impeachment.10 
No one paid much attention to the group or the ad, except for 
the United States Department of Justice.  They looked at the ad, and 
 
 5  See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966). 
 6  The statutory term is “political committee,” defined as a group that makes 
contributions or expenditures for the purpose of influencing a federal election.  See 2 
U.S.C. §431(4) (2006 & Supp. IV 2006).  The term “political action committee” is a 
popular, though not technically accurate, substitute.  See Richard Briffault, Super 
PACs, 96 MINN L. REV. 1644, 1652, n.11 (2012).  
 7  United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F. 2d 1135, 1136–37 (2d 
Cir. 1972). 
 8  Note, Federal Election Campaign Act—Political Committee (United States v. National 
Committee for Impeachment), 48 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 316, 318 (1973). 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. at 317. 
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at the calendar (it was May of an election year) and, with the passage 
of the brand-new Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)— 
which, for the first time, required serious regulation and disclosure of 
any individual or group that spent any money “for the purpose of 
influencing” a federal election11—concluded that this was a campaign 
ad under that new law.12  So the executive branch of the United States 
Government—run, of course, by the President attacked in the ad—
through the Department of Justice, run by his friend, Attorney 
General John Mitchell, brought the litigation weight of the United 
States down on Phillips and his friends.  The government’s theory was 
that the ad was a campaign ad in “opposing” President Nixon, who 
was up for re-election, and “supporting” the praised members of 
Congress, also up for re-election, and, therefore, within the 
regulatory ambit of the FECA.13  This meant that the group violated 
that law by not registering with the government, failing to provide 
information about its officers, receipts, and expenditures and failing 
to disclose to the government the identity of anyone who had 
contributed more than $100 to the activity—a ready-made “enemies 
list” in the offing.  This also meant that the group could not engage 
in any future political speech of that kind without complying with the 
new law.14  Indeed, the government sought an injunction against the 
group’s further First Amendment activity unless it complied—an 
almost unprecedented request for a prior restraint on speech. 
The courts quickly dispatched this effort to suppress political 
speech.  A federal appeals court said that the First Amendment 
requires giving a narrow scope to the FECA.15  The Court explained 
that the FECA could not be used to regulate what we now call “issue 
advocacy,” speech which criticizes—or supports—politicians and 
public officials on the basis of the stance they take on issues and does 
not constitute explicit electoral advocacy.16  Here, the group was 
concerned with war crimes, not with the election or defeat of 
candidates—even though the ad pledged to raise funds for future ads 
and for efforts to support candidates who saw things the same way as 
 
 11  See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 
(1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–57 (2006)). 
 12  United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F. 2d 1135, 1136–37 (2d 
Cir. 1972). 
 13  Id. at 1138. 
 14  Id. at 1136–37. 
 15  See id. at 1141. 
 16  See id. at 1142.  
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the impeachment group.17  The American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), fearing that the theory of the government’s lawsuit might 
threaten its own non-partisan, issue-oriented criticism of public 
officials—most of whom were elected to office—filed suit and secured 
a similar exemption from the campaign finance laws for its issue 
advocacy.18  A proper balance between campaign finance regulations 
and First Amendment rights seemed to have been reached. 
III. THE ACHILLES HEEL OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE CONTROLS 
This judicially-fashioned equilibrium between campaign finance 
regulation and protected political advocacy would be upended a year 
later when Congress, pointing to “Watergate” as a claimed 
justification, passed new and sweeping expansions of the federal 
campaign finance laws.19  These campaign finance laws were 
subsequently challenged on First Amendment grounds in the 
landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo.20 
The new FECA provisions not only severely limited how much 
money could be donated to or spent by candidates and their 
campaigns, but also limited to a paltry $1,000 what any independent 
individual or group could spend in an entire year “relative to a clearly 
identified candidate.”21  That would barely pay for one 1/4 page ad 
in the New York Times.22  Once you or your group sponsored that ad, 
spending a dollar more on speech “relative to” a candidate became a 
federal crime, subject to fine and imprisonment.  That is a pretty 
 
 17  Note, supra note 8, at 319. 
 18  See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973), 
vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v. American Civil Liberties Union, Inc., 422 U.S. 1030 
(1975).  One of the key players organizing the ACLU participation in both cases was 
Ira Glasser, then the Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, the 
New York State affiliate of the ACLU.  Glasser, who would later become the long-time 
Executive Director of the ACLU, championed the liberal organization’s opposition 
to campaign finance restrictions as fundamentally inconsistent with robust free 
speech, vigorous criticism of government, and enhanced political participation.  See 
Ira Glasser, Understanding the Citizens United Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 3, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ira-glasser/understanding-the-emcitiz_b_447342
. html.   
 19  Joel M. Gora, Don’t Feed the Alligators: Government Funding of Political Speech and 
the Unyielding Vigilance of the First Amendment, CATO S. CT. REV. 81, 88 (2010-2011). 
 20  See 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (involving an across-the-board challenge to the FECA 
Amendments of 1974).  See generally Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). 
 21  18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976); see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13, 
n.13.  
 22  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40. 
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breathtaking prospect in a democracy, especially considering the First 
Amendment’s language protecting the right of citizens to criticize 
their government and those who run it.  Overall, the new laws 
seemed to cut to the heart of the First Amendment.  They effectively 
silenced any organized or effective criticism of politicians by limiting 
the amount that could be spent on speech about them and their 
conduct in office.  Limiting the funding of speech clearly limits the 
speech itself—how much one can say, how many issues one can 
discuss, and how deeply one can discuss them.23 
That $1,000 limit on independent political speech, which would 
silence or mute the  Phillipses of yesteryear (not to mention the 
Sheldon Adelsons, George Soroses and the David Kochs of today) 
and, by doing so, all of us whose views they represent and whose 
voices they amplify, seemed aimed at the heart of the First 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court agreed, and in its landmark 
Buckley decision, ruled that limits on how much money one can spend 
for political speech are effective limits on that speech itself.24  The 
Court’s reasoning is instructive for our debates today about the 
validity of Super PACs. 
First, the Buckley Court decided that the First Amendment 
required the law limiting independent expenditures to be applied 
narrowly and interpreted only to cover “express advocacy,” i.e. speech 
which in express terms advocates the election or defeat of a political 
candidate.25  Any broader application would threaten “issue” speech 
involving candidates and undermine the whole point of the First 
Amendment, which was to free up the ability of the citizenry to 
criticize the government.26  Only independent speech that explicitly 
advocated election or defeat could be regulated in any fashion by the 
government, whether through prohibition, regulation, or 
disclosure.27 
But even as so narrowed and limited, the law’s restriction still cut 
to the very heart of the First Amendment right of the people to 
criticize the policies and actions of the government and the 
politicians who run it and to advocate their election or defeat.  That 
undermines both free speech and democracy, since you cannot have 
one without the other.  The government offered three rationales to 
 
 23  Id. at 19. 
 24  See id. at 39.   
 25  Id. at 44. 
 26  See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).   
 27  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39–44. 
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uphold this law and they are echoed strongly in today’s debates about 
Super PACs specifically and campaign finance controls generally. 
 First, the government asserted that independent expenditures 
for “outside” speech would corrupt the politicians helped by that 
speech.  Since contributions given directly to candidates were to be 
limited to $1,000, in order to prevent corruption, independent 
expenditures had to be limited to the same amount in order to 
prevent the creation of a loophole in the law.28  The fear was that 
supporters of candidates, limited in how much they could give to that 
candidate, would go out and spend more money independently to 
support that candidate; this practice had to be thwarted if the 
contribution limits were going to be meaningful and effective.  In a 
way, the government had a point—after all, what’s the point of 
limiting contributions to a candidate if the donor can go out and 
spend much more money independently to help that candidate?  But 
the Court correctly observed that independent expenditures for 
speech posed none of the “corruption” concerns posed by direct 
contributions.29  They were, by definition, independent and not 
coordinated with the candidates or his campaign.  So they could not 
serve the same functions as contributions.  And sometimes the 
support might actually be most unwelcome—Nazis for Romney, for 
one hypothetical example.30  Moreover, the Court noted, one of the 
reasons it was willing to allow limitations on contributions to 
candidates in the first place was that the donors would then be free to 
go out independently and spend as much as they wanted to support 
those same candidates—a kind of constitutional quid pro quo.31  
Finally, since such individuals or groups were now free to spend 
unlimited amounts on speech that fell short of constituting “express 
advocacy,” but might impact campaigns and elections nonetheless, it 
was pointless to limit independent expenditures that did engage in 
express advocacy.32  So, the Court concluded, where independent 
expenditures are concerned, the risks of corruption are low and the 
First Amendment benefits, namely, ensuring robust, uninhibited, and 
wide open debate on politics, politicians, and the conduct of 
 
 28  See id. at 44–45. 
 29  Id. at 46. 
 30  See id. at 47 (“Unlike contributions . . . independent expenditures may well 
provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove 
counterproductive.”). 
 31  See id. at 45. 
 32  See id. at 47–48. 
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government, are high.33 
Second, the government argued the Adelsons and Phillipses of 
the world had to be restrained in order to, as the well-worn phrase 
goes, “level the playing field.”34  This is also like a negative 
“redistribution of speech”: those that can afford to engage in more 
speech should be limited so that those who lack the resources for 
speech will not be disadvantaged.  This philosophy is also frequently 
called the “equality” rationale for campaign finance limitations, a 
kind of lowest common denominator version of free speech.  This 
was a “one person, one picket sign” kind of approach.35  But the 
Court sharply rejected the argument that the government interest in 
“equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence 
the outcome of elections” justifies controls on independent political 
speech advocating election or defeat of candidates: 
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of 
some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment, which was designed to secure the ‘widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources,’ and to ‘assure the unfettered 
exchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.’  The First 
Amendment’s protection against governmental 
abridgement of free expression cannot properly be made to 
depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public 
 
 33  Buckley, at 45–48. 
 34  Id. at 48–49. 
 35  The argument borrowed a theme from the Supreme Court’s “one person, one 
vote” ruling that required each electoral district to contain approximately the same 
number of voters in order to end the gross malapportionment where some districts 
had ten times as many people as others, undermining the influence of the voters in 
the more populous districts.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  The Buckley 
Court rejected this analogy, reasoning that equal political opportunity in 
apportioning electoral districts did not justify a principle of equally limited speech.  
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49, n.55.  A similar theme was invoked by the so-called “access 
to the media” movement, which argued that the concentration of media power in a 
relatively few hands undermined the First Amendment and democracy.  See Jerome 
A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1644 
(1967).  As with the FECA effort to limit speech in order to equalize it, the Court 
resoundingly rejected this form of speech distribution as well by striking down a 
“right of reply” statute which compelled the media to offer free space for rebuttals by 
those whom it had criticized.  Such a government-run requirement and mechanism 
was anathema to free press and free speech principles.  See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257–58 (1974).   
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discussion.36 
The Court’s description of the purposes of the First Amendment, 
where campaign finance and independent speech is concerned, fits 
both Randolph Phillips and Sheldon Adelson perfectly. 
The government’s final argument to justify campaign finance 
limitations on independent expenditures was built on the idea that 
campaigns had become too expensive, that their heavy use of thirty-
second television ads was not what the First Amendment was about 
and that we simply had too much uninformative and unreflective 
campaign speech which had to be limited.  The Court rejected that 
theory in no uncertain terms: 
The First Amendment denies government the power to 
determine that spending to promote one’s views is wasteful, 
excessive or unwise.  In the free society ordained by our 
Constitution it is not the government, but the people 
individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as 
associations and political committees who must retain 
control over the quantity and range of debate on public 
issues on a political campaign. 37 
This insight fits the framework of democracy well, and is reflected in 
the high-spending, vibrant, exciting political campaigns we have been 
conducting in America in recent years.  It also reflects a libertarian, 
anti-censorship theme, which has sounded throughout the Court’s 
First Amendment jurisprudence for a generation now.38 
Sheldon Adelson can thank the Supreme Court’s wisdom in the 
Buckley case for giving constitutional validation to what he is doing to 
support his views on government and politics, advocate for those 
candidates who share those views and will implement those policies 
and amplify the voices of those who think and believe as he does.  In 
doing so, as the Court in Buckley suggested, he is advancing the cause 
of democracy.39  Ever since Buckley, with one exception, the Court has 
reaffirmed that independent campaign expenditures lie at the core 
of the First Amendment and cannot be limited.  The Court applied 
this principle to a small donor PAC,40 a nonprofit ideological 
 
 36  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49–50 (internal citations omitted). 
 37  Id. at 57.  
 38  See Joel M. Gora, An Essay in Honor of Robert Sedler, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 1087, 
1091–98 (2012) (discussing cases in a variety of First Amendment areas where the 
Court has used the anti-censorship theme to reject restrictions on speech). 
 39  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.  
 40  See Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 
U.S. 480 (1985).   
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corporation funded only by individuals,41 and to independent 
expenditures by political parties to support their candidates.42  All are 
free to spend money for independent political advocacy. 
The major doctrinal exception was spelled out in the Court’s 
1990 decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,43 which held 
that corporations could be silenced from engaging in independent 
candidate advocacy because they have too much wealth, which might 
be used to distort the political process.44  Put another way, 
corporations might exercise too much political speech and therefore 
need to be restrained.  That same reasoning was again employed a 
decade later in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission45 which relied 
on Austin  to justify the McCain-Feingold law which banned any 
corporation—profit, nonprofit, shareholder or closely-held, large, 
medium, or small—and any labor union from sponsoring any 
broadcast advertisement that even stated the name of a politician 
during the months before an election.46 
It was these two cases which the Court overturned, properly in 
my view, in its well-known Citizens United decision, ruling that just 
because an organization or group might use its resources to engage 
in free speech, Congress is not justified in banning or limiting it from 
doing so.47  In so ruling, the Court swept away all of the pointless 
distinctions and limitations on expenditures for independent 
political speech.  Individuals and groups, along with corporations, 
unions, and nonprofit organizations, all have the same First 
Amendment rights to use their resources to get out their messages 
about government and the officials who run it.48  As a result, the 
Court upheld the right of a conservative, nonprofit advocacy 
corporation to make, distribute, and advertise a movie criticizing a 
 
 41  See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1976).   
 42  See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 
U.S. 604 (1996).   
 43  494 U.S. 652 (1990) overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010). 
 44  Id. at 660. 
 45  540 U.S. 93 (2003) overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010). 
 46  See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 201, 2 U.S.C. 434(f). 
 47  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. 
 48  See generally Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
935, (2011) (suggesting that the Court properly interpreted the First Amendment in 
the Citizens United case as not allowing distinctions among different persons and 
groups where the right to engage in political speech is concerned). 
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leading candidate for President of the United States.49  What more 
classic embodiment of First Amendment activity could you find? 
In Citizens United, the Court took the Buckley principles of 
protecting the financing of political speech by people, and especially 
independent speech, and made clear that they applied to 
organizations of people as well—namely, corporations, nonprofits, 
and labor unions.  But at the core of both cases is the notion that the 
activities of the Adelsons and the Phillipses, far from being 
condemned and demonized, should be applauded and praised as 
embodiments of the purposes and implementations of the most 
important First Amendment principle of all: the insistence on more 
speech, not government-enforced silence.  Citizens United is certainly 
an important case for protecting independent political speech, but 
the seeds were planted thirty-five years ago in Buckley. 
From Citizens United, it was but a short step to eliminate any 
doubts that if one person, group, or organization can spend 
independently without restraint on political speech, they can 
associate together for the same purposes and without restraint.  Free 
speech plus freedom to associate equals Super PACs.  A lower court 
decision, SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission,50 along with 
several advisory opinions promulgated by the FEC, makes that clear.51 
IV. THE ROAD TO TODAY’S SUPER PACS 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United is often pointed to 
as facilitating the creation of Super PACs and opening “floodgates to 
unlimited corporate spending” in elections.52  While the decision did 
enhance the ability of corporations and other entities, like labor 
unions, to participate in political speech, Citizens United alone should 
not be blamed—or credited—for the creation of Super PACs.  In fact, 
the opponents of unrestrained campaign spending have 
indiscriminately attacked both corporate political spending and 
Super PACs in an effort, unfortunately quite successful, to create the 
misimpression of one gigantic, corrupt, and undemocratic mess.53  
 
 49  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. 
 50  See 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 51  See discussion Infra Part IV. 
 52  Sean Siperstein, Citizens United v. We the People, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 20, 
2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sean-siperstein/citizens-united-v-we-the-
_b_1219221.html.  
 53  See, e.g., Liz Kennedy, 10 Ways Citizens United Endangers Democracy, DEMOS, 
Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.demos.org/publication/10-ways-citizens-united-endangers-
democracy; Chris Cillizza and Aaron Blake, Poll: Voters Want Super PACs to be Illegal, 
GORA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:14 PM 
2013] IN DEFENSE OF SUPER PACS 1195 
 
Three facts need to be kept in mind to sort out the purposely created 
confusion.54  First, the corporation or entity spending on express 
political advocacy that Citizens United authorized never produced the 
avalanche of corporate spending feared.55  Second, the increased 
Super PAC spending was mostly funded by large, indeed, very large, 
donations from individuals—not corporations or unions—
independent spending which was valid from the time of Buckley.56  
Finally, to the extent that corporate—or union—money has been 
funding electorally-related activities by nonprofit organizations, the 
precise extent of which is unknown, that phenomenon well pre-dated 
Citizens United, though that ruling might have given such funding a 
psychological lift.57 
In terms of explicit legal encouragement, the so-called “Super 
PAC frenzy”58 of 2010 and especially 2012 came about as a result of 
several lower court decisions as well as certain advisory opinions 
promulgated by the Federal Election Commission. 
Once again, it all started with Buckley v. Valeo and the Court’s 
holding that while Congress was at liberty to set limitations on 
contributions to political campaigns in the interest of preventing 
corruption or appearance thereof, the legislature had no legitimate 
governmental interest in infringing on individuals’ freedom of 
speech through limiting expenditures, especially independent 
expenditures.59  The Buckley Court did not deal directly with the 
 
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/post/poll-voters-want-super-pacs-to-be-illegal/2012/03/12/gIQA6skT8R_blog
.html 
 54  See Dan Abrams, The Media’s Shameful, Inexcusable Distortion of the Citizens United 
Decision, MEDIATE, Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.mediaite.com/online/the-medias-
shameful-inexcusable-distortion-of-the-supreme-courts-citizens-united-decision/ 
 55  See Briffault, supra note 6, at 1674; see also Eduardo Porter, Business Losing Clout 
in a G.O.P. Moving Right, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/09/04/business/economy/business-losing-clout-in-a-gop-moving-
right.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting that corporate political spending never 
materialized after Citizens United, despite all the dire predictions to the contrary). 
 56  See James Bennet, The New Price of American Politics, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 19, 
2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com /magazine/archive/2012/10/the
/309086/. 
 57  See Dan Eggen, The Influence Industry: Activist Groups Want to Undo Ruling that 
Led to ‘Super PAC’ Frenzy, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2012, 
 http://articles.washingtonpost.com /2012-01-18/politics/35440052_1_petition-drive-
pacs-watchdog-groups; see also Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the 
Political Game?, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22
/magazine/how-much-has-citizens-united-changed-the-political-game.html?_r=0 
 58  See Bai, supra note 57. 
 59  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.  An independent expenditure is an expenditure 
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provision of the FECA banning unions and corporations, including 
nonprofits, from using treasury funds for direct political campaign 
contributions or expenditures.60  Instead, a corporation or a union 
could pay the expenses to set up a PAC, which could then solicit and 
use individual contributions that were limited in both source and 
amount pursuant to the statute.61 
Following Buckley, courts generally struck down limits imposed 
on independent expenditures, finding them to represent “direct and 
substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech” that could 
not be justified by any governmental interest.62  On the other hand, 
courts upheld contribution limits as an effective method of 
preventing corruption, unless the limits were so low, as to prevent a 
candidate from amassing enough funds to effectively advocate his or 
her candidacy.63  Nonetheless, in 1981, the Supreme Court decided 
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, in which the court struck 
down a municipal ordinance setting contribution limits on donations 
to committees formed to support or oppose ballot propositions.64  As 
one scholar put it, the Court found that the contributions “pose[d] 
no danger of corruption as they [did] not involve the election of a 
candidate . . . .”65 
In 2002, Congress amended the FECA by adopting the 
 
that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, but is 
not made in cooperation or coordination with the candidate or the candidate’s 
campaign.  The Citizens United Court observed that the Buckley Court had not dealt 
explicitly with the ban on corporate or union expenditures, but would have likely 
invalidated such a ban if it had addressed the issue.  See Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 346 (2010).   
 60  See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 
81; 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012).  The ban on corporate/union contributions directly to 
federal candidates has been upheld against a constitutional challenge.  See Fed. 
Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003).  A post-Citizens United case 
reached the same conclusion.  See United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (2012); 
see generally Case Note, Fourth Circuit Holds That Ban on Corporate Direct Contributions 
Does Not Violate First Amendment, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (2013) (analyzing Danielczyk).   
 61  Paul S. Ryan, Wisconsin Right to Life and the Resurrection of Furgatch, 19 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 130, 157–58 (2008) (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to 
Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2660–61 (2007)); see also Fed. Election Comm’n Campaign 
Guide, Corporations and Labor Organizations 9 (2007), available at 
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/colagui.pdf.   
 62  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55.  
 63  See id. at 21; see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006) (finding that 
contribution limits that are too stringent “can harm the electoral process by 
preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent 
officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability”). 
 64  See 454 U.S. 290, 291, 300 (1981).  
 65  Briffault, supra note 6, at 1657. 
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Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).  The BCRA retained the 
broad ban on political contributions or expenditures using corporate 
and union treasury funds, and implemented a new, additional ban on 
corporate or union expenditures for electioneering 
communications.66  The court upheld the ban in McConnell v. FEC, 
reasoning that Congress had a legitimate interest in controlling the 
funding of ads that were the “functional equivalent of express 
advocacy.”67  Part of the concern was that such expenditures, like 
direct contributions, might permit preferential access to politicians 
for those sponsoring the ads. 
In a series of post-McConnell decisions, several lower courts 
reconsidered whether such preferential access necessarily constituted 
corruption when applied to independent expenditures.  In 2003, in 
North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down a statute limiting 
individual contributions to independent expenditure committees.68  
The court found that the legislature “failed to proffer sufficiently 
convincing evidence which demonstrates that there is a danger of 
corruption due to the presence of unchecked contributions” to 
independent expenditure-only committees.69  Subsequently, in 
EMILYs List v. Federal Election Commission,70 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also ruled, in effect, that 
“as independent expenditures are not corrupting, the contributions 
funding them could not be corrupting.”71 
The Court first revisited corporate participation in independent 
expenditures in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life 
(“WRTL”).72  The case involved a nonprofit, 501(c)(4) organization, 
which ran ads criticizing the State’s two United States Senators, one 
of whom was up for reelection, on the pace of judicial confirmations.  
The organization argued that the ads were not the “functional 
 
 66  See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 
81.  Electioneering communications are defined as broadcast or similar medium 
messages even mentioning or identifying a federal candidate near to an election.  No 
express advocacy is required. 
 67  McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 203–07 (2003). 
 68  See 344 F.3d 418 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 69  Id. at 434. 
 70  581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 71  Briffault, supra note 6, at 1659.  The statement by the court was technically 
dicta.  The case dealt with FEC regulations limiting which funds certain non-
candidate-specific activity could be funded with and not with independent 
expenditures specifically.   
 72  See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
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equivalent” of express advocacy, and, thus qualified for a 
constitutional exemption from the BCRA’s electioneering 
communication restriction.73  The Court agreed, finding that the 
prohibition did not apply to corporate expenditures for 
advertisements that did not constitute “express advocacy” or the 
functional equivalent of “express advocacy.”74  Effectively, “after 
WRTL, . . . while corporations still could not expressly advocate for 
candidates, they could do most of the issue advocacy they had done 
before the electioneering-communication prohibition . . . .”75 
Finally, the Citizens United Court revisited the portion of 
McConnell that upheld the ban on “electioneering communication,” 
and concluded that the provision was unconstitutional as applied to 
all types of advocacy by all types of entities.76  As is well known by now, 
Citizens United, a nonprofit organization, financed with donations 
from individuals and for-profit corporations, intended to air a film 
entitled “Hillary: The Movie.”77  The film, which mentioned then 
Senator Hillary Clinton by name, was to be available in theaters, on 
DVD, and through a video-on-demand channel beginning in 
December of 2007.78  Citizens United also intended to broadcast 
television advertising to promote the film within thirty days of the 
2008 primary elections, in violation of the ban pursuant to § 203 of 
BCRA, codified under 2 U.S.C. § 441(b). 
The Citizens United Court agreed with the Buckley Court, finding 
that prevention of quid pro quo corruption was the only legitimate 
governmental interest that could justify such infringement on 
constitutional rights.79  The independent expenditures, however, due 
to their lack of prearrangement and coordination with any candidate, 
“[did] not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro 
quo corruption,” and therefore their regulation was not justified, 
whether the speaker was an individual or a corporate entity.80  The 
 
 73  Paul S. Ryan, Wisconsin Right to Life and the Resurrection of Furgatch, 19 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 130, 158 (2008). 
 74  Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007).  
 75  James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission: “Precisely What WRTL Sought to Avoid”, 2010-2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29. 
 76  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010).   
 77  See id. at 320. 
 78  See Matthew A. Melone, Citizens United and Corporate Political Speech: Did the 
Supreme Court Enhance Political Discourse or Invite Corruption?, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 29, 69 
(2010). 
 79  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345–46.  
 80  Id. at 360.   
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Court reasoned that elections call for “more speech, not less” and 
concluded that an “outright ban on corporate political speech during 
the critical pre-election period . . .” was not permissible.81  Thus, as 
indicated above, the portion of McConnell upholding the 
constitutionality of BCRA’s ban on corporate and union funding of 
electioneering communication was overruled, along with Austin v. 
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,82 the earlier decision that had 
allowed limits on independent expenditures by corporations.83  As a 
result, all corporations—and unions—were free to use treasury funds 
leading up to the elections. 
This did not, however, affect contribution limits or prohibitions 
that corporations, unions, and individuals were subject to when 
contributing funds to PACs.84  Thus, following the Court’s decision in 
Citizens United, opponents of campaign finance limits challenged 
these contribution limits both in courts and through the FEC.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
was first to proclaim in SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission that 
Congress had no anti-corruption interest in limiting the amount or 
source of contributions to an independent group.85  Filing suit well 
before the decision in Citizens United came down, SpeechNow.org 
(“SpeechNow”), a nonprofit, unincorporated association, planned to 
accept contributions only from individuals, and not corporations, in 
excess of federal limitations, to engage in “independent 
expenditures” expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate, but without cooperation with or at the request 
or suggestion of such candidate.86  The court concluded that 
contribution limits as applied to SpeechNow “violate[d] the First 
Amendment by preventing [individuals] from donating to 
SpeechNow in excess of the limits and by prohibiting SpeechNow 
from accepting donations in excess of the limits.”87 
Shortly after the Court of Appeals issued the decision, the FEC 
released two advisory opinions, which extended the SpeechNow 
holding to general public corporations, and labor unions, allowing 
them to contribute unlimited funds to PACs, provided that the funds 
 
 81  Id. at 361. 
 82  Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) overruled by 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 83  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.   
 84  See 11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2011). 
 85  See 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 86  See id. at 690. 
 87  Id. at 696. 
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were used solely for independent expenditures and not for direct 
contributions.88  In Advisory Opinion 2010-09, the FEC allowed Club 
for Growth, a 501(c)(4) corporation established to participate 
exclusively in independent expenditures, to solicit unlimited 
contributions from the general public.89  On the same date, in 
Advisory Opinion 2010-11, the FEC determined that Commonsense 
Ten, a registered nonconnected political committee (i.e. one not 
sponsored by a corporation or union), that intended to make only 
independent expenditures, could solicit and accept unlimited 
contributions from corporations and labor organizations in addition 
to the general public.  The combination of the decisions by the FEC 
and the courts led to the creation of the so-called Super PACs,90 also 
referred to as “independent-expenditure-only committees (IEOCs),”91 
capable of unlimited fundraising for independent expenditures and 
unlimited non-coordinated spending. 
In addition, another recent decision by the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia allowed regular PACs to function 
like Super PACs as long as they maintained separate accounts 
exclusively for independent expenditures.  The organization at issue 
in Carey v. Federal Election Commission—the National Defense PAC 
(NDPAC)—was planning on making direct political contributions 
and independent expenditures from two separate accounts.92  The 
court ruled and the FEC agreed that the contribution limits would 
not be enforced against the PAC with regard to contributions NDPAC 
received to make independent expenditures, as long as the 
organization maintained separate bank accounts for (1) independent 
 
 88  See Commonsense Ten, A.O. 2010-11, 2010 WL 3184269 (Fed. Election 
Comm’n July 22, 2010); Club for Growth, A.O. 2010-09, 2010 WL3184267 (Fed. 
Election Comm’n July 22, 2010).  
 89  Traditional PACs can only solicit contributions from certain categories of 
individuals known as “the restricted class.”  See Fed. Election Comm’n Campaign 
Guide, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 20 (2007), available at  
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/colagui.pdf.  For a corporation, such a class consists of the 
corporation’s executive and administrative personnel, the stockholders and their 
family members.  For labor union, the class includes “union members, its executive 
and administrative personnel and families of both groups.”  Id. at 20–21. 
 90  Eliza Newlin Carney, FEC Rulings Open Door for “Super” PACs, NAT’L J., Aug. 2, 
2010, http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/fec-rulings-
open-door-for-super-pacs-20100802. 
 91  R. Sam Garrett, “Super PACs” in Federal Elections: Overview and Issues for Congress, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 2 (Oct. 6, 2011), available at 
http://op.bna.com/der.nsf/id/rtar-8n6pkq/$File
/Super%20Pacs%20in%20Federal%20Elections.pdf.Super 
 92  See 791 F. Supp. 2d 121, 127 (D.D.C. 2011). 
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expenditures and (2) source and amount limited contributions for 
the purpose of making candidate contributions.93 
Thus, today’s Super PACs were born, through a complicated 
process, ultimately tracing its progenitor to Buckley v. Valeo, but with 
the important moment of midwifery by Citizens United.94 
V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? THE VERDICT ON SUPER PACS 
Are these Super PACs—anchored in Buckley, with a crucial assist 
from Citizens United and SpeechNow.org—wrecking our democracy and 
putting our government up for sale to the highest bidder?  That is 
what many charge: there is too much speech; it is all so negative; it 
gives some points of view an unfair advantage; it will give undue 
access and influence to the Big Spenders.95  That is not what I see on 
our electoral landscape.  In the 2012 elections I saw Presidential and 
Congressional campaigns where the generous funding generated the 
kind of robust, wide-open, vigorous, unrestrained, competitive, and 
informative political campaigns that our elections should be and that 
our democracy requires.  And Super PACs play an important role in 
fueling that debate and generating that interest.  To those who 
complain about the “cacophony” that all of this campaign spending 
and speech is causing, the Supreme Court has provided an apt 
response: “[t]hat the air may at times seem filled with verbal 
cacophony is . . . not a sign of weakness but of strength.”96 
Current estimates put the total spending on the 2012 federal 
elections at approximately $7.3 billion.97  Of that amount, perhaps $2 
billion, or less than one third, was spent by “outside” groups and 
individuals—Super PACs, nonprofits, and others.98  Of that $2 billion 
only approximately $383 million has been estimated to have come 
from undisclosed sources, and none from Super PACs which are 
subjected to extensive disclosure.99  Thus, the so-called “dark money” 
 
 93  See id. at 132.  
 94  New Jersey has recently recognized the validity of Super PACs in state 
elections.  See Matt Friedman, State Campaign Finance Agency Lifts Political Contribution 
Caps for Independent Groups, NJ.COM, (May 28, 2013 2:33 PM), http://www.nj.com
/politics/index.ssf/2013/05/state_campaign_finance_lifts_p.html. 
 95  See Editorial, The Cacophony of Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/opinion/the-cacophony-of-money.html.   
 96  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).  
 97  See Current Issues in Campaign Finance Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. On Crime and Terrorism, 113th  Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Bradley A. Smith, 
Chairman, Center for Competitive Politics).  
 98  See id.  
 99  See id. 
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or unreported money accounted for less than five percent of total 
election-related spending, and none of it involved Super PACs.100  
The amount of Super PAC spending has been estimated to be 
between $600 million and $800 million, approximately ten percent of 
overall federal spending.101  This was a dramatic increase over such 
spending in the 2010 Congressional elections, but was 
understandable since spending surrounding campaigns typically 
increases during Presidential election years; moreover, 2012 was a 
year with key hotly contested and expensive Senate races.102  Despite 
the myths and half truths about Super PACs, they are playing an 
important role in our elections by amplifying the voices of the people 
whose viewpoints they represent.  Nor is big corporate money 
swamping these elections.  In fact, precisely the opposite is the case.  
As the New York Times recently reported, very few public 
corporations contribute to Super PACs, and “[v]irtually no public 
corporations have spent their own money directly in political 
campaigns, a practice now permitted under the Supreme Court’s 
Citizens United decision.”103  So, the immediate, post-decision hysteria 
that corporations would control our elections has proven to be totally 
unfounded. 
On the other hand, most of the money contributed to Super 
PACs comes from individuals, though a significant amount has come 
from unions and nonprofit organizations.  To be sure, a large portion 
of the Super PAC funding has come from a relatively small number of 
very wealthy individuals.  But the same can be said for ownership of 
major news media and sponsorship of major foundations, all of which 
are part of our political debate.  Unless we want to impose some kind 
of across-the-board leveling principle on any individual’s annual 
financial participation in politics and government—a kind of “one 
 
 100  See id. 
 101  Estimates vary as to the precise amount.  See Briffault, supra note 6, at n.2 (“In 
2010, Super PAC spending exceeded ten percent of total candidate spending in 
sixteen Senate and House elections.”).  One of the campaign spending monitor 
groups puts the number at $609 million.  Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
www.opensecrets.org/pacs/Superpacs.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2013). 
 102  See R. Sam Garrett, Super PACs in Federal Elections: Overview and Issues for 
Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 18 (Apr. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42042.pdf; see also, Super PACs, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, www.opensecrets.org/pacs/Superpacs.php (last visited Sept. 26, 
2013) (estimating Super PAC spending at $609 million). 
 103  Nicholas Confessore, S.E.C. Gets Plea: Force Companies to Air Donations, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2013, at A1. To be sure, some corporations—as well as many 
unions—may be funding nonprofit 501(c)(4) organizations, but that is a different 
issue from Super PACs. 
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person/one picket sign” rule—we should celebrate the outputs, not 
condemn the inputs. 
Similarly, Super PACs are anything but secret, and their funds 
are anything but “dark money.”  On the contrary, those committees 
are fully registered with the Federal Election Commission, and they 
have to file periodic reports identifying everyone who contributes 
even a penny more than $200 in an entire calendar year—a trivially 
low amount, which sacrifices political privacy and anonymity for no 
substantial government purpose.  These committees must also detail 
expenditures, and they have to report any broadcast ads that 
constitute “electioneering communications” almost immediately.  
That is why we know so much about Sheldon Adelson and all the 
other people and groups that fund Super PACs. 
As to the responsibility for “negative” “attack” ads, do not blame 
the Super PACs alone.  The candidates themselves and their 
campaigns also showed a real appetite for brutal and harsh 
commentary about their opponents.  Just look at the numerous 2012 
attack ads on Governor Mitt Romney and Bain Capital by the Obama 
Campaign.104  Finally, more often than not, Super PACs come to the 
aid of challengers and newcomers seeking to unseat incumbents and 
entrenched interests.  In a real sense, the Super PACs have done 
their fair share to “level the playing field.”  The enhanced 
competitiveness that they provide gives a shot in the arm to 
competitive politics, which, in turn, rejuvenates our political system 
and our democracy. 
Unfortunately, the public has been told a different story, one 
which blames Citizens United for unleashing the “flood of unfettered 
political spending.”105  “Not since the Gilded Age has our politics 
been opened so wide to corporate contributions and donations from 
secret sources.”106  However, what many fail to realize is that while 
some Super PAC funds do come from corporations and unions, “the 
 
 104  See, e.g., Sara Dover, Obama Attack Ad Brings Up Mitt Romney’s Swiss Bank 
Account, INT’L BUS. TIMES, May 1, 2012, http://www.ibtimes.com/ 
obama-attack-ad-brings-mitt-romneys-swiss-bank-account-694006; Helene Cooper and 
Michael D. Shear, Facing Criticism, Obama Defends Ads Attacking Romney’s Record at Bain 
Capital, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/us/politics/ 
obama-defends-attacks-on-romneys-record-at-bain.html?_r=0. 
 105  Molly Ball, Did Citizens United Help Democrats in 2012?, NAT’L J. (Dec. 3, 2012 
11:13 AM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/ 
did-citizens-united-help-democrats-in-2012-20121203?mrefid=site_search. 
 106   Bennet, supra note 56. 
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vast majority have been provided by wealthy individuals who, well 
before Citizens United, were permitted to spend unlimited sums 
independently, but were subject to a federal statutory limit of $5000 
on the amounts they could give to the federal PACs that expressly 
support or oppose federal candidates.”107  As previously explained, 
independent spending PACs were permitted to solicit unlimited 
donations from corporations, labor unions, and the general public 
after the FEC promulgated two advisory opinions post-Citizens United. 
Likewise, despite all of the dire warnings that right-wing money 
would control the 2012 elections, President Obama secured 
reelection handily, and the Republicans managed to lose several 
Senate races they expected to win.  The Republicans kept control of 
the House, but by a narrower margin.  Overall, there was a good deal 
of spending on all sides, and lots of spending by conservative groups 
and Super PACs.  But when the dust settled, despite all of that 
spending and the hundreds of millions of dollars spent by 
conservative groups attacking Democrats, little changed in 
Congress.108  The Republican Party lost two seats in the Senate, which 
went to a Democrat and an Independent, and eight seats in the 
House of Representatives, with all eight seats now occupied by newly 
elected Democrats.109 
Ezra Klein described the myths that the media purveyed to the 
public concerning the role of money in the 2012 elections.  Klein, a 
prominent political observer and journalist, introduced a recent 
panel discussion on money, politics, and inequality with the following 
mea culpa: 
But it’s hard to look at the 2012 election, with its record 
fundraising and the flood of Super PACs and all the rest of 
it, and come away really persuaded that money was a 
decisive player.  And yet the way we talked about money in 
the run-up to the 2012 election, we really suggested it would 
be a decisive player.  In fact, we suggested, quite often, that 
it wouldn’t just decide the election, but that it would 
 
 107   Briffault, supra note 6, at 1645.  The constitutionality of such a ceiling as 
applied to donations to an independent spending group has been in question ever 
since Justice Harry Blackmun’s concurring opinion in CMA v. FEC, 454 U.S. 182, 203 
(1981).  
 108  Matthew DeLuca & Michael Keller, Not-So-Super PACs: 2012’s Winners and 
Losers, THE DAILY BEAST (Nov. 15, 2012 4:45 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/15 
/not-so-Super-pacs-2012-s-winners-and-losers.html. 
 109  House Races, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/election-results-
2012/house.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody (last visited Sept. 26 2013). 
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imperil democracy itself. So I think we have some 
explaining to do.  And I think this panel is a good time to 
start.110 
So, in the final analysis, what is the harm in letting the Adelsons, 
the Kochs, and the Soroses spend vast amounts of money to support 
political activity and the ideas they believe?  Two answers are usually 
given. 
First, no one person should have too much speech.  But that flies 
directly in the face of a core First Amendment principle to encourage 
more speech, not to coerce silence, as campaign finance limits do.  It 
also undermines the core purpose of the First Amendment: to get as 
much information to the public as possible, especially about 
government and politics and public officials.  Indeed, democracy is 
dependent on the most well-informed electorate rather than one 
forced to get their information from limited sources.  Similarly, the 
Adelsons of the world give voice to and amplify the voices of all of the 
people who believe as they do.  If I agree with him, then when he 
speaks or supports speech, he speaks for me.  My speech is leveraged 
by his.  And, if he has too much speech, how much is too much?  If 
the First Amendment allows the principle of not allowing any one 
person or group to have too much speech, or spend too much money 
on too much speech, should we take away Rupert Murdoch’s media 
empire, or George Soros’s foundation empire?  Under such a leveling 
principle, we would also have to address the difficult question of 
exactly what speech we are covering here with our “too much” 
blanket: express advocacy speech, mere mention of a candidate 
speech, issue speech?  And, of course, do not forget that we are 
letting a government full of incumbents make all these rules and 
appoint the people who will enforce them.  The recent exposure of 
IRS political harassment of conservative groups provides a timely 
reminder, if one were necessary, of the perils of putting the fox in 
charge of the chicken coop.111  Finally, we have never insisted on 
some kind of proportional representation between the resources 
available to support an idea and the popularity of that idea.  If we 
 
 110  Ezra Klein, We got way too excited about money in the 2012 elections, WONK BLOG, 
(May 6, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp
/2013/05/06/we-got-way-too-excited-over-money-in-the-2012-elections/.   
 111  See Jonathan Weisman, Scrutiny of Political Nonprofits Sets Off Claim of 
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07
/us/politics/irs-scrutiny-of-political-groups-stirs-harassment-claim.html
?pagewanted=all; see also Summary of IRS News, TAX PROF BLOG, 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/irs_news/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). 
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had, none of the rights movements of the last half century would 
have been possible, because they started out as unpopular or 
unaccepted ideas and required extensive resources to lift their voices 
and get their messages out; the gay rights movement is only one 
recent prominent example.112 
Second, no person should have too much political influence 
based on their financial resources.  But people and groups that use 
their resources to help elect candidates whose policies they support 
will always have influence with those candidates if they are elected.  
Once again, that is not corruption, but democracy—a feature, not a 
bug, of our system.  It is why we have elections, so we can do all we 
can to support the candidates of our choice with the understanding 
they will carry out the policies we supported them to carry out in the 
first place.  One major union devoted tens of millions of dollars to 
help elect President Obama in 2008 on the expectation that his 
policies would be labor-friendly if he was elected.113  And to ensure 
that was the case, the president of that union visited the White House 
on a dozen occasions in the first two years of the Obama 
Administration.114  By the way, of course, the much-reviled Citizens 
United decision freed up unions to spend money to support favored 
candidates just as it freed up corporations.  This illustrates what many 
political scientists have shown: policy does not follow support, 
support follows policy.115  In short, there is no harm and much benefit 
in what the Super PACs and their supporters do. 
 There is only one severe drawback in all of this unlimited 
 
 112  Civil rights groups such as the NAACP and the ACLU depended on a relatively 
small number of large donors to help them get started with their controversial 
causes.  See Ralph K. Winter, The History and Theory of Buckley v. Valeo, 6 J. L & POL’Y 
93, 108–09 (1997).  The same has been true of other left-wing groups.  See Ben 
Joravsky, Seed Money: The Crossroads Fund, a Foundation for the Left-out, CHICAGO 
READER, Apr. 14, 1988, http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/seed-money-the-
crossroads-fund-a-foundation-for-the-left-
out/Content?oid=872064#.UlniP27kL7c.email.  In contemporary times, the same has 
been true for the gay rights movement.  See Erik Eckholm, Supporters of Same-Sex 
Marriage See Room for Victories, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/us/politics/gay-marriage-supportors-hope-to-
win-in-4-states.html?ref=erikeckholm&_r=0.   
 113  See Steven Greenhouse, Obama Receives Union Endorsements, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 
2008), available at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/09/obama-to-get-
union-endorsement/. 
 114  Steven Greenhouse, In Obama, Labor Finds the Support It Expected, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 1, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/washington
/02labor.html. 
 115   See Daniel Hays Lowenstein et. al., Election Law: Cases and Materials 676–79 
(5th ed., 2012). 
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political giving and spending, which is, by and large, so beneficial for 
our democracy.  That is that our two most central, important political 
actors—our candidates and our parties—have to fight their political 
battles with one hand tied behind their back.  While their 
expenditures cannot be limited, contributions to them can be.116  As a 
result, candidates and parties face the prospect of being outspent by 
independent individuals and groups who are no longer restrained in 
terms of what they can raise and spend.  That is a potential imbalance 
in our political and electoral speech system that should concern us.117 
In light of all the unrestrained independent spending, we need 
to revisit whether the continued limits on contributions to parties 
and candidates serve any of the purposes claimed for them or that 
are recognized as constitutionally acceptable.  Maybe we should finish 
the job that Buckley solved only partially, that Citizens United improved 
considerably, but that still needs to be studied. That task is to develop 
a system of no limits on political giving and spending to expand the 
speech that is fostered thereby, smart disclosure of large 
contributions to candidates to assess improper influence potential, 
and, even more broadly, serious public funding to raise the playing 
field for all candidates.  If this approach seems a bit jarring, consider 
the opposite end of the spectrum of alternatives: putting the 
government in charge of how much political speech we the people 
can have by ceding plenary control over the funding of that speech to 
the very government that our political speech is supposed to monitor, 
control, and change.  That strikes me as the scariest proposition of 
all, and one that the First Amendment should not tolerate.  I will take 
my chances with the wisdom and good judgment of the people, not 
the government. 
 
 
 116  The basic $1,000 contribution limit, upheld in Buckley, is still the law, though it 
has been statutorily adjusted for inflation and is currently $2,600.  The question of 
the validity of aggregate contribution limits is currently before the Court in 
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2012), prob. 
juris. noted,  
133 S. Ct. 1242 (2013).  See Joel M. Gora, McCutcheon v. FEC and The Fork In the 
Road, SCOTUS Blog, Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08
/symposium-mccutcheon-v-fec-and-the-fork-in-the-road/prob. 
 117  See generally PETER J. WALLISON & JOEL M. GORA, BETTER PARTIES, BETTER 
GOVERNMENT: A REALISTIC PROGRAM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2009).   
